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Judicial Decisions
Supreme Court of the United States, No. 35, Orig.*
United States, Plaintiff,v. State of Maine et al.
On Exceptions to Report of Special Master [March 17, 1975]
MR. Jusric WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. III, § 2, and 28
U.S.C. § 1251 (b), the United States in April 1969 asked leave to file a
complaint against the 13 States bordering on the Atlantic Ocean-Maine, New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.'
We granted leave to file, 395 U.S. 955, on June 16, 1969. The complaint
asserted a separate cause of action against each of the States, and each alleged
that:
The United States is now entitled, to the exclusion of the defendant State, to exercise
sovereignty rights over the seabed and subsoil underlying the Atlantic Ocean, lying
more than three geographical miles seaward from the ordinary low watermark and
from the outer limits of inland waters on the coast, extending seaward to the outer
edge of the Continental Shelf, for the purpose of exploring the area and exploiting the
natural resources.

It was further alleged that each of the States claimed some right or title to the
relevant area and was interfering with the rights of the United States. It was
therefore prayed that a decree be entered declaring the rights of the United
States and that such further relief be awarded as may prove proper.2
The defendants answered, each generally denying proprietary rights of the
United States in the seabed in the area beyond the three-mile marginal sea.
Each of them, except Florida, 3 claimed for itself, as successor in title to certain
* From the Slip Opinion.
'The State of Connecticut was not made a defendant, apparently because that State borders on
Long Island Sound, which is considered inland waters rather than open sea.
YThe United States also demanded an accounting for all sums that the States may have derived
from the area in question. This claim the Special Master recommends be denied for failure of proof.
The United States does not except to this recommendation, and we approve it.
3
The State of Florida claimed that by virtue of the Act of June 25, 1868, 15 Stat. 73, Congress had
approved the maritime boundaries for that State which at certain places included more than three
miles of the Atlantic Ocean and had thereby granted to the State all of the seabed within those
boundaries. Florida also claimed in its answer that the Florida Straits were not in the Atlantic
Ocean as claimed by the United States but in the Gulf of Mexico. Subsequently, the controversy
between the United States and Florida was severed and consolidated with the proceeding in No. 9
Original which was then concerned with the seabed rights of the State of Florida in the Gulf of
Mexico, 403 U.S. 949, 950 (1971). The consolidated proceedings were given a new numberOriginal 52. We have acted on the Special Master's Report in that case. See ante, p..
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grantees of the Crown of England (and in the case of New York, to the Crown of
Holland), the exclusive right of dominion and control over the seabed underlying the Atlantic Ocean seaward from its coastline to the limits of the
jurisdiction of the United States, asserting as well that any attempt by the
United States to interfere with these rights would in itself violate the Constitution of the United States.4
Without acting on the motion for judgment filed by the United States that
asserted that there was no material issue of fact to be resolved, we entered an
order appointing the Honorable Albert B. Maris as Special Master and referred
the case to him with authority to request further pleadings, to summon
witnesses and to take such evidence and submit such reports as he might deem
appropriate. 398 U.S. 947 (1970). Before the Special Master, the United States
contended that based on UnitedStates v. California,332 U.S. 19 (1947), United
States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950), and United States v. Texas, 339 U.S.
707 (1950), it was entitled to judgment in accordance with its motion. The
defendant States asserted that their cases were distinguishable from the prior
cases and that in any event, California,Louisiana, and Texas were erroneously
decided and should be overruled. They offered, and the Special Master
received, voluminous documentary evidence to support their claims that,
contrary to the Court's prior decisions, they acquired dominion over the offshore seabed prior to the adoption of the Constitution and at no time
relinquished it to the United States. At the conclusion of the proceeding before
him, the Special Master submitted a Report which the United States supports in
all respects but to which the States have submitted extensive and detailed
exceptions. The controversy is now before us on the Report, the exceptions to it
and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties.
In his Report, the Special Master concluded that the Calijbrnia, Louisiana
and Texas cases, which he deemed binding on him, governed this case and
required that judgment be entered for the United States. Assuming, however,
that those cases were open to re-examination, the Special Master went on
independently to examine the legal and factual contentions of the States and
concluded that they were without merit and that the Court's prior cases should
be reaffirmed.
We fully agree with the Special Master that California,Louisiana, and Texas
rule the issues before us. We also decline to overrule those cases as the
defendant States request us to do.
United States v. California,supra, involved an original action brought in this
Court by the United States seeking a decree declaring its paramount rights, to
the exclusion of California, to the seabed underlying the Pacific Ocean and
'The States of Rhode Island, North Carolina, and Georgia each submitted an additional special
defense applicable only to itself. We agree with the Special Master's rejection of these special
defenses, and they will not be mentioned further.
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extending three miles from the coastline and from the seaward limits of the
State's inland waters. California answered, claiming ownership of the disputed
seabed. The basis of its claim, as the Court described it, was that the three-mile
belt lay within the historic boundaries of the State; "that the original thirteen
states acquired from the Crown of England title to all lands within their
boundaries under navigable waters, including a three-mile belt in adjacent seas;
and that since California was admitted as a state on an 'equal footing' with the
original states, California at that time became vested with title to all such
lands." 332 U.S., at 23. The Court rejected California's claim. The original
Colonies had not "separately acquired ownership of the three-mile belt or the
soil under it, even if they did acquire elements of the sovereignty of the English
Crown by their revolution against it." 332 U.S., at 31. As the Court viewed our
history, dominion over the marginal sea was first accomplished by the National
Government rather than by the Colonies or by the States. Moreover, the Court
went on to hold that the "protection and control of [the marginal sea] has been
and is a function of national external sovereignty," 332 U.S., at 34, and that in
our constitutional system paramount rights over the ocean waters and their
seabed were vested in the Federal Government.
The United States later brought actions to confirm its title to the seabed
adjacent to the coastline of other States. United States v. Louisiana, supra, was
one of them. There Louisiana claimed title to the seabed under waters extending
27 miles into the Gulf of Mexico, the basis of the claim being that before and
since the time of her admission to the Union, Louisiana had exercised dominion
over the ocean area in question and that her legislature had formally included
the 27-mile belt within the boundaries of the State. The Court gave judgment
for the United States, holding that United States v. Californiawas controlling
and emphasizing that paramount rights in the marginal sea and seabed were
incidents of national sovereignty:
As we pointed out in United States v. California, the issue in this class of litigation
does not turn on title or ownership in the conventional sense. California, like the
thirteen original colonies, never acquired ownership in the marginal sea. The claim to
our three-mile belt was first asserted by the national government. Protection and
control of the area are indeed functions of national external sovereignty. 332 U.S. pp.
31-34. The marginal sea is a national, not a state concern. National interests, national
responsibilities, national concerns are involved. The problems of commerce, national
defense, relations with other powers, war and peace focus there. National rights must
therefore be paramount in that area. 339 U.S., at 704.
Louisiana had "no stronger claim to ownership of the marginal sea than the
original 13 Colonies or California had," id., at 705; and its claim, like theirs,
gave way to the overriding rule that "the three-mile belt is in the domain of the
Nation rather than of the separate States," id., at 7. A fortiori, the waters and
seabed beyond that limit were governed by the same rule.
In a companion case, Uaited States v. Texas, supra, the Court again
reaffirmed the holding and rationale of United States v. California and again
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rejected the claims of the State based on her historic boundaries at the time of
the State's admission to the Union:
If the property, whatever it may be, lies seaward of low-water mark, its use,
disposition, management, and control involve national interests and national
responsibilities. That is the source of national rights in it. Such is the rationale of the
Calijbrniadecision which we have applied to Louisiana's case. The same result must
be reached here if"equal footing" with the various States is to be achieved. Unless any
claim or title which the Republic of Texas had to the marginal sea is subordinated to
this full paramount power of the United States on admission, there is or may be in
practical effect a subtraction in favor of Texas from the national sovereignty of the
United States. Yet neither the original thirteen States (United States v. Callbrnia,
supra, pp. 31-32) nor California nor Louisiana enjoy such an advantage. 339 U.S., at
719.
The Special Master was correct in concluding that these cases, unless they are
to be overruled, completely dispose of the States' claims of ownership here.
These decisions considered and expressly rejected the assertion that the original
States were entitled to the seabed under the three-mile marginal sea. They also
held that under our constitutional arrangement paramount rights to the lands
underlying the marginal sea are an incident to national sovereignty and that
their control and disposition in the first instance are the business of the Federal
Government rather than the States.
The States seriously contend that the prior cases, as well as the Special
Master, were in error in denying that the original colonies had substantial rights
in the seabed prior to independence, and afterwards, by grant from or
succession to the sovereignty of the Crown. Given the dual basis of the
Californiadecision, however, and of those that followed it, the States' claims of
ownership prior to the adoption of the Constitution are not dispositive.
Whatever interest the States might have had immediately prior to statehood, the
Special Master was correct in reading the Court's cases to hold that as a matter
of "purely legal principle . . . the Constitution . . . allotted to the federal
Government jurisdiction over foreign commerce, foreign affairs and national
defense" and that "it necessarily follows, as a matter of constitutional law, that
as attributes of those external sovereign powers of the federal government has
paramount rights in the marginal sea." Report, at 23.
United States v. Texas unmistakably declares this constitutional proposition.
There, Texas claimed that prior to joining the Union, she was an independent
sovereign with boundaries extending a substantial distance in the Gulf of
Mexico-boundaries which Congress had allegedly recognized when Texas was
admitted to the Union. In deciding against the State, the Court did not reject
the prestatehood rights of Texas as it had the rights of the 13 original States in
the California case. On the contrary, the Court was quite willing to "assume
that as a republic she had not only full sovereignty over the marginal sea but
ownership of it, of the land underlying it and of all the riches which it held. In
other words, we assume that it had dominium and imperium in and over this
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 9, No. 3
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belt which the United States now claims." 339 U.S., at 717. Such prior ownership nevertheless did not survive becoming a member of the Union:
When Texas came into the Union, she ceased to be an independent nation. She then
became a sister State on an "equal tooting" with all the other States. That act
concededly entailed a relinquishment of some of her sovereignty. The United States
then took her place as respects foreign commerce, the waging of war, the making of
treaties, defense of the shores, and the like. In external affairs the United States became the sole and exclusive spokesman of the Nation. We hold that as an incident to
the transfer of that sovereignty any claim that Texas may have had to the marginal sea
was relinquished to the United States. 339 U.S., at 717-718.
The Court stood squarely on the Californiaand Louisiana cases for this conclusion; and in our view, the Special Master correctly read these authorities, unless
they were to be overruled in all respects, as foreclosing the present efforts of the
States to demonstrate error in the Court's understanding of history in the
California case.
Assuming the possibility, however, that the Court might re-examine the constitutional premise of California and similar cases, the Special Master
proceeded, with admirable diligence and lucidity, to address the historical
evidence presented by the States aimed primarily at establishing that the
Colonies had legitimate claims to the marginal sea prior to independence and
statehood and that the new States never surrendered these rights to the Federal
Government. The Special Master's ultimate conclusion was that the Court's
view of our history expressed in the California case was essentially correct and
that if prior cases were open to re-examination, they should be reaffirmed in all
respects.
We need not retrace the Special Master's analysis of historical evidence, for
we are firmly convinced that we should not undertake to re-examine the
constitutional underpinnings of the California case and of those cases which
followed and explicated the rule that paramount rights to the offshore seabed
inhere in the Federal Government as an incident of national sovereignty. That
premise, as we have indicated, has been repeated time and again in the cases. It
is also our view, contrary to the contentions of the States, that the premise was
embraced rather than repudiated by Congress in the Submerged Lands Act of
1953. In that legislation, it is true, Congress transferred to the States the rights
to the seabed underlying the marginal sea; but this transfer was in no wise
inconsistent with paramount national power but was merely an exercise of that
authority. As the Special Master said, the Court in its prior cases "did not
indicate that the federal government by Act of Congress might not, as it did by
the subsequently enacted submerged Lands Act, grant to the riparian states
rights to the resources of the federal area, subject to the reservation by the
federal government of its rights and powers of regulation and control for
purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs."
Report, at 16. The question before the Court in the California case was
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 9, No. 3
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"whether the state or the Federal Government has the paramount right and
power to determine in the first instance when, how, and by what agencies,
foreign or domestic, the oil and other resources of the soil of the marginal sea,
known or hereafter discovered, may be exploited." 332 U.S., at 29. The
decision there was that the National Government had the power at issue, the
Court declining to speculate that "Congress, which has constitutional control
over Government property, will execute its power in such a way as to bring
about injustices to states, their subdivisions, or persons acting pursuant to their
permission." 332 U.S., at 40.
The Submerged Lands Act did indeed grant to the States dominion over the
offshore seabed within the limits defined in the Act and released the States from
any liability to account for any prior income received from state leases that had
been granted with respect to the marginal sea.' But in further exercise of
paramount national authority, the Act expressly declared that nothing in the
Act
shall be deemed to affect in any wise the rights of the United States to the natural
resources of that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the Continental Shelf lying
seaward and outside of [the marginal sea] all of which natural resources appertain to
the United States, and the jurisdiction and control of which by the United States is
confirmed. 43 U.S.C. § 1302.
This declaration by Congress is squarely at odds with the assertions of
the States in the present case. So too is the provision of the Act by which the
grant to the States is expressly limited to the seabed within three miles (or three
marine leagues in some cases) of the coastline, whether or not the States'
historic boundaries might extend farther into the ocean. § 1301(b). Moreover,
in the course of litigation dealing with the reach and impact of the Act, the
Court has said as plainly as may be that "the Act concededly did not impair the
validity of the California, Louisiana and Texas cases, which are admittedly
applicable to all coastal States. . . ." United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 7;
see also id., at 83 n. 140. We agree with the Special Master when he said that
"[itis quite obvious that Congress could reserve to the federal government all
the rights to the seabed of the continental shelf beyond the three-mile territorial
belt of sea (or three leagues in the case of certain Gulf States) only upon the
basis that it already had the paramount right to that seabed under the rule laid
down in the California case." Report, at 19.
Congress emphatically implemented its view that the United States has
paramount rights to the seabed beyond the three-mile limit when a few months
later it enacted the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1331 et seq. Section 3 of the Act declared [it] "to be the policy of the United

'The Submerged Lands Act was held constitutional in Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954).
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States that the subsoil and seabed of the Outer Continental Shelf appertain to
the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of
disposition as provided in this subchapter." The Act then proceeds to set out
detailed provisions for the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction in the area and for
the leasing and development of the resources of the seabed.
Of course, the defendant States were not parties to United States v.
California or to the relevant decisions and they are not precluded by res
adjudicata from litigating the issues decided by those cases. But the doctrine of
stare decisis is still a powerful force in our jurisprudence; and although on
occasion the Court has declared-and acted accordingly-that constitutional
decisions are open to re-examination, we are convinced that the doctrine has
peculiar force and relevance in the present context. It is apparent that in the
almost 30 years since California, a great deal of public and private business has
been transacted in accordance with those decisions and in accordance with
major legislation enacted by Congress, a principal purpose of which was to
resolve the "interminable litigation" arising over the controversy of the
ownership of the lands underlying the marginal sea. See H.R. Rep. No. 215,
83d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1953). Both the Submerged Lands Act and the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act which soon followed proceeded from the premises
established by prior Court decisions and provided for the orderly development
of offshore resources. Since 1953, when this legislation was enacted, 33 lease
sales have been held, in which 1940 leases. embracing over eight million acres,
have been issued. The Outer Continental Shelf, since 1953, has yielded over
three billion barrels of oil, 19 trillion m.c.f. of natural gas, 13 million long tons
of sulfur, and over four million long tons of salt.6 In 1973 alone, 1,081,000
barrels of oil and 8.9 billion cubic feet of natural gas were extracted daily from
the Outer Continental Shelf. 7 Exploitation of our resources offshore implicates
a broad range of federal legislation, ranging from the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, incorporated into the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, in the more recent Coastal Zone Management Act. 8 We are
quite sure that it would be inappropriate to disturb our prior cases, major
legislation, and many years of commercial activity9 by calling into question, at
this date, the constitutional premise of prior decisions. We add only that the

'S. Rep. No. 93-1140, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1974).
'Id., at 5.
'86 Stat. 1280 (1972). For a summary of legislation affecting the Outer Continental Shelf, see
Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development and the Coastal Zone, A Report for the Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 55-58 (1974).
'We have long held that the doctrine of staredecisis carries particular force where the effect of reexamination of a prior rule would be to overturn long-accepted commercial practice. See, e.g.,
M'Gruderv. Bank of Washington, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 598, 602 (1824); Rock Spring Distilling Co.
v. W. A. Gaines & Co., 246 U.S. 312, 320 (1918).
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Atlantic States, by virtue of the California,Louisiana, and Texas cases, as well
as by reason of the Submerged Lands Act, have been on notice of the substantial
body of authoritative law, both constitutional and statutory, which is squarely at
odds with their claims to the seabed beyond the three-mile marginal sea.
Neither the States nor their putative lessees have been in the slightest misled.
Judgment shall be entered for the United States.
So ordered.
MR. JusricE DouaAs took no part in the consideration or decision of this

case.
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